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THE ENFORCEABILITY OF PREHIRE AGREEMENTS
The creation of a collective bargaining agreement between an
employer and a labor union prior to majority recognition of the
union is an unfair labor practice under the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (NLRA or the Act).1 Section 8(f) of the Act,2 however,
stipulates that an employer engaged primarily in the construction
industry may make an agreement with a union before that union
has been elected the employee representative under procedures set
forth in the Act.3 Nonetheless, the effect of a prehire agreement 4 is
uncertain for two reasons: first, the union, a party to the contract,
1. National Labor Relations Act §§ 7, 8(a)(5), 8(b)(3), 9(a), 29 U.S.C. §§ 157, 158(a)(5),
158(b)(3), 159(a) (1976); H.R. REP. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. 9, reprinted in [1947] U.S.
CODE CONG. SERV. 1135, 1144, 1148-49, 1152. This rule recognizes that a labor union should
represent a majority of employees and that an employer cannot grant coveted exclusive bar-
gaining status to a union having the support of only a minority of'employees. International
Ladies' Garment Workers' Union v. NLRB, 366 U.S. 731, 737 (1961):
2. National Labor Relations Act § 8(f), 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1976).
3. Id. The statute reads in part:
It shall not be an unfair labor practice ... for an employer engaged primar-
ily in the building and construction industry to make an agreement covering
employees engaged (or who, upon their employment, will be engaged) in the
building and construction industry with a labor organization of which building
and construction employees are members ... because (1) the majority status
of such labor organization has not been established ... prior to the making of
such agreement .... Provided further, That any agreement which would be
invalid, but for clause (1) of this subsection, shall not be a bar to a petition
filed pursuant to section [9(c) or 9(e) of the Act].
Id.
4. The term prehire agreement refers to an agreement between an employer and a union
entered into prior to the hiring of any employees. See Retail Clerks Locals 128 & 633 v. Lion
Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17, 27 (1962). Because Congress intended to allow prehire agree-
ments only as a means to create an initial bargaining relationship prior to employee hiring,
prehire agreements cannot be executed when the union already is the recognized bargaining
agent of the employees. Bricklayers & Masons Local 3, 162 N.L.R.B. 476, 478 (1966), en-
forced, 405 F.2d 469 (9th Cir. 1968). See also Audit Servs. Inc. v. Stewart & Janes, 622 P.2d
217, 220 (Mont. 1981).
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has not achieved the status of employee representative when the
contract is signed;5 and second, Congress intended that the prehire
agreement be only a temporary accommodation between the em-
ployer and union pending the negotiation and execution of a col-
lective bargaining agreement after the signatory union is officially
recognized. This Note discusses the question of the enforceability
of prehire agreements that have not matured into collective bar-
gaining agreements.
LEGISLATIVE PURPOSE OF SECTION 8(f)
Under the Wagner Act,7 the National Labor Relations Board
(NLRB or the Board) declined jurisdiction over the building and
construction industry because the Board concluded that the indus-
try was substantially organized and did not require Board protec-
tion.8 After enactment of the Taft-Hartley Act in 1947, 9 the Board
determined that Congress intended Board regulation of labor rela-
tions in the construction industry, and, therefore, the Board exer-
cised its jurisdiction in cases involving the industry.10 In so doing,
the Board concluded that only a union elected as the majority rep-
resentative of employees could enter into negotiations for a collec-
tive bargaining agreement.1 This requirement created serious
problems for the construction industry, which theretofore had re-
5. See note 3 & accompanying text supra.
6. R.J. Smith Constr. Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 693, 694 (1971), enforcement denied sub nom.
Local 150, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 480 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1973).
7. National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449 (1935) (amended
1947). References to the Wagner Act refer to the Act in force between 1935 and the 1947
enactment of the Labor Management Relations Act, 1947 (Taft-Hartley Act), ch. 120, 61
Stat. 136. When the NLRA is referred to as the Act, reference to the NLRA as amended to
date is intended. The National Labor Relations Act (Wagner Act), ch. 372, 49 Stat. 449
(1935), as amended by Labor Management Relations Act (Taft-Hartley Act), ch. 120, 61
Stat. 136 (1947) (amended 1948), and the Labor-Management Reporting and Disclosure Act
of 1959 (Landrum-Griffin Act), Pub. L. No. 86-257, §§ 701-707, 73 Stat. 541 (amended 1970)
constitute the National Labor Relations Act (NLRA), 29 U.S.C. §§ 141-187 (1976 & Supp.
11 1979). See B. WERNE, 1 LABOR RELATIONs: LAW & PRACTIcE § 1.1 (1966).
8. S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 27, reprinted in [1959] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2318, 2344.
9. The Taft-Hartley Act is the popular name for the Labor Management Relations Act
(LMRA), ch. 120, 61 Stat. 136 (1947). The Taft-Hartley Act substantially amended the
NLRA, incorporating many provisions of that Act. See note 7 supra.
10. S. REP. No. 1509, 82d Cong., 2nd Sess. 4 (1952).
11. Id. at 5.
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lied on collective bargaining agreements being executed before the
hiring of any employees. 2 Consequently, the inability of the con-
struction industry to conform to the requirements imposed by the
Board precipitated the inclusion of section 8(f) in the Landrum-
Griffin Act of 1959.13
Congressional recognition and approval of prehire agreements
came in response to the special needs of the construction industry.
The intermittent employer-employee relationships that character-
ized the construction industry made the conventional prerequisites
for collective bargaining impractical. 14 Brevity of the employment
term and fluidity among local employers mandated that collective
bargaining agreements be concluded before employees were hired
for any particular job.15 Such agreements were necessary because
an employer had to be able to compute labor costs in estimating
bids for specific job contracts."' Furthermore, upon attaining a
construction contract award, an employer had to rely on a union to
provide quick and easy access to skilled workers.17
Enactment of section 8(f) provided the construction industry
with the flexibility needed to enter into collective bargaining agree-
ments covering prospective employment before the signatory union
established majority employee status.'8 In addition, the hiring hall
provision of section 8(f) ensured the employer of access to a pool of
skilled union workers after obtaining a contract award.19 Despite
12. Id.
13. Labor-Management Reporting & Disclosure Act of 1959 (Landrum-Griffin Act), Pub.
L. No. 86-257, § 705, 73 Stat. 545 (currently National Labor Relations Act § 8(f), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(f) (1976)); H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 19, reprinted in [1959] U.S. CODE
CONG. & AD. NEws 2424, 2442.
14. S. REP. No. 187, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 55, reprinted in [1959] U.S. CODE CONG. & AD.
NEWS 2318, 2373.
15. S. REP. No. 1509, 82d Cong., 2nd Sess. 3-4 (1952).
16. H.R. REP. No. 741, 86th Cong., 1st Sess. 19, reprinted in [1959] U.S. CODE CONG. &
AD. NEws 2424, 2442.
17. Id.
18. See NLRB v. Local 103, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers,
434 U.S. 335, 349 (1978).
19. The hiring hall provision of § 8(f) allows the employer to inform the signatory labor
union of any employment opportunities or to give the union the opportunity to refer quali-
fied applicants for such employment. National Labor Relations Act § 8(f)(3), 29 U.S.C.
§ 158(f)(3) (1976). The provision, however, does not give the union license to refuse to refer
qualified nonunion employees to the employer. Local 18, Bricklayers, Masons & Plasterers'
Int'l Union v. NLRB, 407 F.2d 1309, 1311 (3d Cir. 1969).
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the broad language of section 8(f), however, Congress apparently
did not intend to exempt the construction industry employer from
compliance with the majority representation rule, which requires
an employer to bargain with the union that represents a majority
of its employees. 20 Rather, Congress enacted section 8(f) with the
understanding that a prehire agreement would mature into a full
collective bargaining agreement upon determination of the major-
ity status of the union. 21 Thus the issue arose whether a prehire
agreement could be enforced when the signatory union never
achieved majority support.22
The courts and the Board disagreed on the proper resolution of
this issue. In the few early court cases that addressed the enforce-
ability issue, the courts held that such agreements were enforce-
able contracts.25 The Board, on the other haid, held that prehire
agreements could not be enforced unless the signatory union had
shown majority employee support.24 This dichotomy of opinion
20. See R.J. Smith Constr. Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 693, 694 (1971), enforcement denied sub
nom. Local 150, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs, 480 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Ruttmann
Constr. Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 701, 702 (1971).
21. Id.
22. For a discussion of the role of representation elections in determining majority sup-
port for a union, see, for example, Washington Area Carpenters' Welfare Fund v. Overhead
Door Co., 488 F. Supp. 816, 819 (D.D.C. 1980); Albuquerque Insulation Contractor, Inc., 256
N.L.R.B. No. 15, 107 L.R.R.M. 1254, 1256 (May 18, 1981).
For a discussion of the significance of union membership in assessing support for a union,
see Precision Striping, Inc. v. NLRB, 642 F.2d 1144, 1147 (9th Cir. 1981); Authorized Air
Conditioning Co. v. NLRB, 606 F.2d 899, 906 (9th Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 950
(1980).
23. Local 150, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. NLRB, 480 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1973);
Construction & Gen. Laborers Local 1140 v. Sheesley-Winter Constr. Joint Venture, 421 F.
Supp. 137 (D. Neb. 1976).
Although both courts found the respective prehire agreements enforceable, they followed
different rationales in reaching that conclusion. The United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit held that until a representation election is held a prehire agree-
ment is valid and enforceable. Local 150, Int'l Union of Operating Eng'rs v. NLRB, 480 F.2d
at 1189-91. The United States District Court for the District of Nebraska, on the other
hand, held that an action for breach of the prehire agreement could be maintained pursuant
to the National Labor Relations Act § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185 (1976). Construction & Gen.
Laborers Local 1140 v. Sheesley-Winter Constr. Joint Venture, 421 F. Supp. at 140. See
notes 69-80, 108-116 & accompanying text infra for a detailed discussion of these remedies.
24. See Dee Cee Floor Covering, Inc., 232 N.L.R.B. 421 (1977); Local 103, Int'l Ass'n of
Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, 216 N.L.R.B. 45 (1975), enforcement de-
nied, 535 F.2d 87 (D.C. Cir. 1976), NLRB ruling enforced, 434 U.S. 335 (1978); R.J. Smith
Constr. Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 693 (1971), reu'd sub nom. Local 150, Int'l Union of Operating
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brought the issue before the United States Supreme Court in the
1978 case of NLRB v. Local 103, International Association of
Bridge, Structural and Ornamental Iron Workers.25
In Iron Workers, the Supreme Court affirmed a Board decision"
holding that a union committed an unfair labor practice under sec-
tion 8(b)(7)(C) of the Act 27 by picketing to enforce a prehire agree-
ment against an employer when that union did not represent a ma-
jority of the employees. 2 8 The Court adopted the Board's position
that a prehire agreement did not secure protection for the picket-
ing activity of a minority union29 and that, until the union estab-
lished majority employee status, the prehire agreement was "voida-
ble" by either signatory party.30
In affirming the decision of the Board, the Court relied on the
Board's interpretation of section 8(f).3 1 In Iron Workers the Court
followed the Board's reasoning that, because the final proviso of
section 8(f) permits an election to be held to determine the status
of a union, 2 an employer does not commit an unfair practice by
refusing to honor the prehire contract and bargain with the union
when the union has failed to establish majority support.33 The
Court upheld the Board's opinion that a prehire agreement is
nothing more than a preliminary contracting step in the establish-
ment of a lawful collective bargaining relationship" and that, when
a union fails to secure such a relationship, its prehire agreements
become unenforceable and an employer has no duty to honor these
Eng'rs v. NLRB, 480 F.2d 1186 (D.C. Cir. 1973); Ruttmann Constr. Co., 191 N.L.R.B. 701
(1971).
25. 434 U.S. 335 (1978).
26. Local 103, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, 216 N.L.R.B.
45 (1975).
27. 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(C) (1976).
28. 434 U.S. at 340. Section 8(b)(7)(C) provides that picketing by a minority union with
an object of attaining recognition as the majority representative is an unfair labor practice
unless the union files a petition for an NLRB election within 30 days after the picketing has
commenced. National Labor Relations Act § 8(b)(7)(C): 29 U.S.C. § 158(b)(7)(C) (1976).
29. 434 U.S. at 341.
30. Id.
31. Id. at 340.
32. National Labor Relations Act § 8(f), 29 U.S.C. § 158(f) (1976).
33. 434 U.S. at 345.
34. Id.
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agreements.35
Applying this interpretation of section 8(f) to the section 8(b)(7)
situation, the Board had determined that the employer's right to
abrogate the prehire agreement made the union's picketing to en-
force the agreement the equivalent of picketing to obtain recogni-
tion as the exclusive bargaining agent of the employees.3 In Iron
Workers the Court affirmed this equation of enforcement picketing
with recognitional picketing on the basis of the transitional charac-
ter of prehire agreements.3 A further consideration for the Court,
however, was the general policy against picketing by a minority
union.38 The Court noted that Congress, in adopting section
8(b)(7)(C), sought to minimize union interference with employees'
freedom of choice in selecting their bargaining agent.39 In light of
the possibility that picketing could coerce employees into selecting
one employee representative over another, the Court determined
that barring a minority union from picketing to enforce a prehire
agreement was not unreasonable.40 Thus, the Court affirmed the
Board's opinion and held that recognitional picketing by the union
violated section 8(b)(7)(C) in the Iron Workers case because the
union had not filed a petition for an election within thirty days
after picketing commenced.4
The decision in Iron Workers is ambiguous and precedentially
weak on the question of whether prehire agreements are enforce-
able contracts when the signatory union has not become the major-
ity employee representative. Because Iron Workers involved sec-
tion 8(b)(7)(C) and the specific situation of a union picketing to
enforce a prehire agreement, the decision may be limited to situa-
tions involving only recognitional picketing. Several courts have
held that the Iron Workers case is inapplicable in cases not involv-
ing recognitional picketing.4 2 Moreover, in Iron Workers the Court
35. Id.
36. Local 103, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Wtrkers, 216 N.L.R.B.
45, 46 (1975).
37. 434 U.S. at 345.
38. Id. at 346.
39. Id.
40. Id. at 349.
41. Id. at 346.
42. See, e.g., Western Wash. Cement Masons Health & Sec. Trust Funds v. Hillis Homes,
Inc., 26 Wash. App. 224, 612 P.2d 436 (1980).
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denied the Board's position the weight of clear precedent by con-
cluding that the Board's interpretation of section 8(f) was one of
many possible valid interpretations." Finally, the determination
by the Court that prehire agreements are voidable when the signa-
tory union lacks majority support fails to define whether such
agreements are wholly unenforceable or enforceable only until
some affirmative voiding act is taken."
PICKETING TO ENFORCE PREHIRE AGREEMENTS
Although the courts have not questioned the precedential effect
of Iron Workers in cases involving picketing to enforce prehire
agreements, courts have questioned the scope of the holding in
Iron Workers. One court construed Iron Workers to proscribe any
use of picketing to enforce a prehire agreement. 45 The Board, how-
ever, recently rejected this construction of Iron Workers and set
forth its interpretation of the Iron Workers holding in Interna-
tional Union of Operating Engineers, Local 150.46
In Operating Engineers the Board determined that the Court in
Iron Workers did not equate picketing to enforce prehire agree-
ments with recognitional picketing in all situations and held that
picketing to enforce past obligations assumed under a prehire
agreement was permissible.'7 Specifically, the Board held that the
ban on picketing to enforce prehire agreements does not apply
when a union uses picketing to pressure the employer to pay previ-
ously owed fringe benefit contributions.4 The Board reasoned that
43. 434 U.S. at 341 n.7. The Supreme Court's deference to the Board on the question of
an unfair labor practice may be no less than any court's deference to the decisions of that
administrative body. A court that reviews a Board decision should not approach the statu-
tory construction issue de novo and without regard to the administrative interpretation of
the statutes. Id. at 351. Although the Board's findings of fact must be given great weight by
a reviewing court, e.g., Dycus v. NLRB, 615 F.2d 820, 824-26 (9th Cir. 1980), the Board's
application of the law is subject to judicial review. See, e.g., NLRB v. Madison Courier, Inc.,
472 F.2d 1307 (D.C. Cir. 1972).
44. Compare Paddack v. Clark, 107 L.R.R.M. 2325, 2327 (D. Or. 1980) (strict nonenforce-
ment rule) with Florida Marble Polishers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Megahee, 102
L.R.R.M. 2740, 2741 (M.D. Fla. 1979) (affirmative voiding act required).
45. Western Wash. Cement Masons Health & Sec. Trust Funds v. Hillis Homes, Inc., 26
Wash. App. 224, 612 P.2d 436 (1980).
46. 255 N.L.R.B. No. 83, 106 L.R.R.M. 1399 (April 6, 1981).
47. Id.
48. Id. at -, 106 L.R.R.M. at 1402-03.
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retrospective picketing does not have as its goal union recognition
and is intended only to enforce past obligations that the employer
undertook in the prehire agreement. 49 By making the delinquent
contributions, the employer in Operating Engineers could have
satisfied the union demand and achieved removal of the pickets
without granting recognition to the union or continuing to apply
the terms of the prehire agreement. 50 The Board considered this
interpretation to be consistent with the general principle of
noncoercion in union selection because permitting retrospective
picketing did not interfere with the election of a collective bargain-
ing representative. 5' The Board distinguished Iron Workers be-
cause in that case the employer would have needed to apply cur-
rently the prehire agreement provisions to its nonunion operations
in order to comply with the union demand.2
The Board's characterization of Iron Workers is logical. Allowing
retrospective picketing to enforce a prehire agreement does not co-
erce employees in the selection of a representative union. Further-
more, the decision in Operating Engineers is appropriate because
in Iron Workers the Supreme Court affirmed a Board decision 8
and the Board has the power to modify its prior decisions.
65
Another court also has rejected the interpretation of Iron Work-
ers that would proscribe any use of picketing to enforce prehire
agreements. In Donald Schriver, Inc. v. NLRB,55 the United States
Court of Appeals for the District of Columbia Circuit recognized
that section 8(b)(7)(C) permits picketing for thirty days and indi-
cated that union picketing for less than thirty days would not con-
stitute an unfair labor practice.5 6 The Court determined that the
prohibition of picketing without knowing whether the union in-
tended to file for an election within the thirty day period required
under section 8(b)(7)(C) was unreasonable.5 7
49. Id. at _, 106 L.R.R.M. at 1402.
50. Id. at -, 106 L.R.R.M. at 1402-03.
51. Id. at _, 106 L.R.R.M. at 1403.
52. Id.
53. See notes 31-41 & accompanying text supra.
54. Local 103, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, 434 U.S. at
351.
55. 635 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 101 S. Ct. 2058 (1981).
56. Id. at 868 & n.11.
57. Id.
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The Board recently adopted this interpretation of Iron Workers
in Albuquerque Insulation Contractor, Inc.55 In Albuquerque In-
sulation, the Board further determined that employers cannot
charge a union with unlawful picketing until the thirty day period
provided by section 8(b)(7)(C) has expired. 9
ENFORCEABILITY OF PREHIRE AGREEMENTS IN NONPICKETING
SITUATIONS
In addition to cases heard after Iron Workers involving picket-
ing to enforce prehire agreements, several cases have dealt with the
enforceability of prehire agreements when picketing was not in-
volved. The courts in these cases have been concerned primarily
with whether Iron Workers is valid precedent in nonpicketing situ-
ations.60 Based on their holdings, the cases fall into three distinct
groups. Some courts and the Board have held that the language of
Iron Workers supporting a rule of nonenforcement of prehire
agreements absent majority support is applicable to all prehire
agreements regardless of whether recognitional picketing is in-
volved."1 The courts interpret the term "voidable" in Iron Work-
ers6 2 to mean that prehire agreements are strictly unenforceable
when the signatory union has not obtained majority employee
support.63
Other courts have held that prehire agreements are enforceable
retrospectively.6 4 These courts have adopted the position that
under Iron Workers some affirmative act is required to void a
prehire agreement.6 5 Thus, these courts have enforced prehire
agreements retrospectively up until the time of repudiation. 6
58. 256 N.L.R.B. No. 15, 107 L.R.R.M. 1254 (May 18, 1981).
59. Id. at -, 107 L.R.R.M. at 1256.
60. See, e.g., Western Wash. Cement Masons Health & Sec. Trust Funds v. Hillis Homes,
Inc., 26 Wash. App. 224, 612 P.2d 436 (1980).
61. See, e.g., Precision Striping, Inc. v. NLRB, 642 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1981); UMW Dist.
4 v. Otis Elevator Co., 491 F. Supp. 496 (W.D. Pa. 1980); Land Equipment, Inc., 248
N.L.R.B. 685 (1980).
62. See note 30 & accompanying text supra.
63. See, e.g., Paddack v. Clark, 107 L.R.R.M. 2325, 2327 (D. Or. 1980).
64. See, e.g., Western Wash. Laborers-Employers Health & Sec. Trust Fund v. Newman,
90 Lab. Cas. 25,913 (W.D. Wash. 1980).
65. See, e.g., id. at 25,914-15.
66. See, e.g., id.
1982l
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A third group of courts has transcended the parameters of the
Iron Workers precedent and established a rationale for enforcing
prehire agreements that is outside the scope of Iron Workers.
These courts have held that Iron Workers does not preclude en-
forcement of prehire agreements by means other than bringing un-
fair labor practice charges. 67 More specifically, these courts have
allowed suits to be brought on actions of breach of contract.6 8
Strict Nonenforcement Cases
The United States Courts of Appeals for the District of Colum-
bia69 and Ninth Circuits, 70 several federal district courts,7 1 and the
Board72 have held that prehire agreements are unenforceable when
the signatory union has failed to establish its status as employee
representative. These courts based their decisions on language in
Iron Workers that purportedly established the rule making major-
ity support a condition precedent to the validity of any prehire
agreement.73 Under this interpretation of Iron Workers, prior to a
union showing of majority support, a prehire agreement is not a
valid, enforceable contract, and adherence to the contract must re-
main purely voluntary on the part of the signatory parties. 4 An
employer, therefore, is free to abrogate the agreement at any time
67. See, e.g., Contractors, Laborers, Teamsters & Eng'rs Health & Welfare Plan v. Associ-
ated Wrecking Co., 638 F.2d 1128 (8th Cir. 1981); Trustees of Atlanta Iron Workers Local
387 Pension Fund v. Southern Stress Wire Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1097 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
68. See, e.g., Contractors, Laborers, Teamsters & Eng'rs Health & Welfare Plan v. Associ-
ated Wrecking Co., 638 F.2d 1128, 1133 (8th Cir. 1981).
69. Donald Schriver, Inc. v. NLRB, 635 F.2d 859 (D.C. Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 451 U.S.
976 (1981).
70. Precision Striping, Inc. v. NLRB, 642 F.2d 1144 (9th Cir. 1981).
71. See, e.g., Baton Rouge Bldg. & Constr. Trades Council v. E.C. Schafer Constr. Co.,
492 F. Supp. 534 (M.D. La. 1980); UMW Dist. 4 v. Otis Elevator Co., 491 F. Supp. 496
(W.D. Pa. 1980); Washington Area Carpenters' Welfare Fund v. Overhead Door Co., 488 F.
Supp. 816 (D.D.C. 1980); Vermeer v. Aloha Contractors, Inc., 107 L.R.R.M. 2895 (D. Or.
1980); Paddack v. 'Clark, 107 L.R.R.M. 2325 (D. Or. 1980); Western Wash. Laborers-Em-
ployers Health & Sec. Trust Fund v. McDowell, 103 L.R.R.M. 2219 (W.D. Wash. 1979).
72. Land Equip., Inc., 248 N.L.R.B. 685 (1980); C.M. Masonry Co., 245 N.L.R.B. 267
(1979); Dee Cee Floor Covering, Inc., 232 N.L.R.B. 421 (1977); Local 103, Int'l Ass'n of
Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers, 216 N.L.R.B. 45 (1975), enforcement de-
nied, 535 F.2d 87 (D.C. Cir. 1976), NLRB ruling enforced, 434 U.S. 335 (1978).
73. See, e.g., Paddack v. Clark, 107 L.R.R.M. 2325, 2327 (D. Or. 1980).
74. See, e.g., Vermeer v. Aloha Contractors, Inc., 107 L.R.R.M. 2845, 2897 (D. Or. 1980).
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prior to the union's attainment of majority status."
The courts that invoke the rule of strict nonenforcement rely on
the Supreme Court decision in Iron Workers,7 6 and, in fact, certain
language in that case indicates that such a rule may be valid. 7 In a
discussion on the tangential question of the enforceability of a
prehire agreement by means of a suit on the contract, the Court
indicated that a prehire agreement might be unenforceable absent
a showing that the union is the majority representative.7 This dic-
tum, coupled with the language of the Court defining prehire
agreements as transitory, preliminary instruments contemplating
further development into full collective bargaining contracts,79 has
led the strict nonenforcement courts to conclude that majority sta-
tus of the signatory union is an essential condition precedent to
enforcement without which the prehire agreement is meaningless
and void.80
The arguments supporting the strict nonenforcement rule do not
stand up to scrutiny. The language upon which courts rely for this
holding was dictum directed to the irrelevant problem of contract
suits.81 Although the language indicates that a strict nonenforce-
ment rule may be established, the discussion is speculative and
permissive; 2 the Court's discussion of such a rule cannot be con-
strued as a directive to find prehire agreements unenforceable in
all instances. More important to the issue of enforceability is the
Supreme Court's agreement with the Board that such contracts are
voidable.83 Because voidability establishes the validity of the con-
tract until the parties elect to avoid the instrument," the Supreme
75. See, e.g., Washington Area Carpenters' Welfare Fund v. Overhead Door Co., 488 F.
Supp. 816, 818 (D.D.C. 1980).
76. See Paddack v. Clark, 107 L.R.R.M. 2325, 2327 (D. Or. 1980).
77. See NLRB v. Local 103, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structual & Ornamental Iron Workers,
434 U.S. at 351-52.
78. Id.
79. Id. at 345.
80. See, e.g., Paddack v. Clark, 107 L.R.R.M. 2325, 2327 (D. Or. 1980).
81. See NLRB v. Local 103, Int'l Ass'n of Bridge, Structural & Ornamental Iron Workers,
434 U.S. at 351-52.
82. The Court states that "[ilt would not be inconsistent... to hold that... absent a
showing that the union is the majority's chosen instrument, the contract is unenforceable."
Id.
83. Id. at 341.
84. Toy Toy v. Hopkins, 212 U.S. 542, 548 (1909); BLAcK's LAW DICTIONARY 1411 (rev. 5th
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Court's use of the term "voidable" over the more nugatory word
"void" indicated its intent not to make prehire agreements strictly
unenforceable. Thus, the rule of strict nonenforcement is neither a
logical nor reasonable interpretation of Iron Workers.
Retrospective Enforcement Cases
In contrast to the decisions holding prehire agreements strictly
unenforceable, several federal district courts 5 have held that
prehire agreements are enforceable retrospectively. These courts
agree with the strict nonenforcement courts that prehire agree-
ments generally are unenforceable and are terminable at will by
either party,'86 but they require that an affirmative voiding act be
taken before the prehire agreement becomes unenforceable. 87 This
requirement allows enforcement of the agreement retrospectively
up to the point of affirmative termination. 8 Once such notice has
been given, however, the agreement becomes wholly
unenforceable.89
Having established the requirement of affirmative notice of ter-
mination, however, few courts defined what constituted a sufficient
act of termination. The United States District Court for the East-
ern District of Virginia in Eastern District Council of United
Brotherhood of Carpenters v. Blake Construction Co.90 deter-
mined that courts should judge the adequacy of notice of termina-
tion of prehire agreements by the standard of reasonable notice.9 1
The court further concluded that reasonable notice could be deter-
mined only on an ad hoc basis. 2 Aside from this general standard,
ed. 1979).
85. Western Wash. Laborers-Employers Health & Sec. Trust Fund v. Newman, 90 Lab.
Cas. 25,913 (W.D. Wash. 1980); Florida Marble Polishers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v.
Megahee, 102 L.R.R.M. 2740 (M.D. Fla. 1979); Eastern Dist. Council of United Bhd. of
Carpenters v. Blake Constr. CQ., 457 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Va. 1978).
86. See, e.g., Eastern Dist. Council of United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Blake Constr. Co., 457
F. Supp. 825, 830 (E.D. Va. 1978).
87. See, e.g., Florida Marble Polishers Health & Welfare Trust Fund v. Megahee, 102
L.R.R.M. 2740, 2741 (M.D. Fla. 1979).
88. See, e.g., id. at 2741-42.
89. See, e.g., id. at 2741.
90. 457 F. Supp. 825 (E.D. Va. 1978).
91. Id. at 830.
92. Id.
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the court did not establish any tangible guidelines on what com-
prises reasonable notice. The court found, however, that the notice
provision for termination of collective bargaining agreements in
section 8(d) of the NLRA93 was not applicable to prehire
agreements."
The arguments advanced by the courts supporting retrospective
enforcement of prehire agreements focused on the inequity that
the rule of strict nonenforcement creates. Prehire agreements ben-
efit signatory employers as much as they do signatory unions and
employees. 5 In exchange for adhering to the provisions of prehire
agreements, employers receive the benefits of certainty in their la-
bor costs and ready access to laborers.98 For an employer to reap
these benefits and then to abrogate retroactively the agreement,
escaping its contractual obligations and shattering the expectations
of the employees, would be grossly unfair.9 The requirement of
affirmative notice of termination protects the employees' expecta-
tions of the wages and benefits that the prehire agreement guaran-
93. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1976). The section provides, in part, that no party shall terminate
a collective bargaining agreement unless the terminating party serves written notice upon
the other party 60 days prior to the proposed termination date. Id.
94. 457 F. Supp. 830. The court reasoned that, because a prehire agreement is not the
result of collective bargaining but is merely a preliminary step to the development of a
collective bargaining agreement, the notice provisions of § 8(d) regarding termination of
collective bargaining agreements do not apply. Id. The court in Blake went on to determine
that the denial of the very existence of a contract, although not necessarily the same as a
positive termination, was a sufficiently material breach as to satisfy notice of intent to ter-
minate. Id. at 831.
Other examples of ad hoc determinations of adequate notice of termination have been
both obvious and tentative. One court found that receipt of a telegram of termination prior
to receipt of the unsigned prehire agreement was sufficient to terminate. W.C. James, Inc. v.
Oil, Chem. & Atomic Workers Local 4-449, 646 F.2d 1292, 1295 (8th Cir. 1981). Another
court held that an employer's election to make trust fund contributions only for union em-
ployees was not a sufficient act to terminate the prehire agreement provision requiring con-
tributions for nonunion employees. Florida Marble Polishers Health & Welfare Trust Fund
v. Megahee, 102 L.R.R.M. 2740, 2741 (M.D. Fla. 1979). The court determined that this act
did not necessarily put the trust fund on notice that the contract had been declared void
and unenforceable as to nonunion employees. Id.
95. Contractors, Laborers, Teamsters & Engrs Health & Welfare Plan v. Associated
Wrecking Co., 638 F.2d 1128, 1134 (8th Cir. 1981).
96. Id.
97. Western Wash. Laborers-Employers Health & Sec. Trust Fund v. Newman, 90 Lab.
Cas. 25,913, 25,915 (W.D. Wash. 1980).
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tees.98 Furthermore, allowing an employer to abrogate retroactively
a prehire agreement at any time would render the agreement
meaningless. 9 According to the courts, Congress did not intend, in
establishing the section 8(f) exception, that prehire agreements
should be ignored arbitrarily.
100
The retrospective enforcement rule is both a fair and logical in-
terpretation of the rule of voidability of prehire agreements estab-
lished in Iron Workers. Although the inconclusive nature and un-
certain language of Iron Workers make a rule of strict
nonenforcement possible, 01 reason and equity dictate that prehire
agreements should be valid until some affirmative act of termina-
tion is taken. The use of the term "voidable" by the Supreme
Court indicates that the Court intended such an interpretation,0 2
but other considerations also compel this conclusion. The retro-
spective enforcement rule is superior to the strict nonenforcement
rule because the retrospective enforcement rule considers the un-
fairness of allowing subsequent abrogation of a prehire agreement
by the employer 0 3 and does no serious injury to the majority rep-
resentation principle. An employer that has received benefits from
a prehire agreement reasonably can be expected to fulfill its con-
tractual obligations under that agreement when it has given no no-
tice of an intent to abrogate the prehire agreement. Although an
employer's failure to live up to all the terms of a prehire agreement
could be construed as notice of an intent to terminate the agree-
ment,104 the question of termination should be one of fact to be
determined by a court and should not be assumed under a rule of
strict nonenforcement.
Although one may argue that enforcing prehire agreements ab-
sent union majority status violates the majority representation
98. Id.
99. Western Wash. Cement Masons Health & Sec. Trust Funds v. Hillis Homes, Inc., 26
Wash. App. 224, -, 612 P.2d 436, 441 (1980).
100. See, e.g., NLRB v. Irvin, 475 F.2d 1265, 1271 (3d Cir. 1973); Trustees of Atlanta Iron
Workers Local 387 Pension Fund v. Southern Stress Wire Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1097, 1104
(N.D. Ga. 1981).
101. See notes 77-80 & accompanying text supra.
102. See notes 83-84 & accompanying text supra.
103. See notes 96-100 & accompanying text supra.
104. See note 94 supra.
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rule,"0 5 this contention loses credibility when the realities of retro-
spective enforcement are explored. Because section 8(f) creates an
exception to the majority representation rule,"0 ' the provisions of
valid prehire agreements unquestionably are legitimate if the par-
ties voluntarily adhere to them.107 Enforcement of prehire provi-
sions pending notice of termination breaches the majority repre-
sentation rule no more than does section 8(f). Rather, enforcement
ensures that expected benefits will accrue to the workers until an
act of termination occurs. Retrospective enforcement thus protects
the interests of the workers and does not impose an unreasonable
burden on the employer.
Section 301 Contract Remedy Cases
In addition to the cases holding prehire agreements strictly un-
enforceable and those holding them retrospectively enforceable,
another line of cases has permitted the enforcement of prehire
agreements through suits for breach of contract.108 These cases are
difficult to distinguish from the retrospective enforcement cases
because both types of cases involved section 301109 suits for breach
of contract.11 0 Although similar in format and result to the retro-
spective enforcement cases,11 the cases allowing a breach of con-
105. See notes 73-75 & accompanying text supra.
106. See notes 1-3 & accompanying text supra.
107. Id. In debate on § 8(f), Senator John F. Kennedy remarked: "It was not the inten-
tion of the committee to require. . . the making of prehire agreements, but, rather, to per-
mit them .... The purpose of this section is to permit voluntary prehire agreements." 104
CONG. REc. 11308 (1958).
108. See, e.g., Trustees of Atlanta Iron Workers Local 387 Pension Fund v. Southern
Stress Wire Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1097 (N.D. Ga. 1981).
109. Section 301 of the National Labor Relations Act provides that parties may bring suit
in federal court for a violation of a contract between an employer and a labor organization
regardless of the amount in controversy or diversity of the parties. National Labor Relations
Act § 301(a), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1976).
110. Compare Trustees of Atlanta Iron Workers Local 387 Pension Fund v. Southern
Stress Wire Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1097, 1099 (N.D. Ga. 1981) and New Mexico Dist. Council
of Carpenters v. Mayhew Co., 107 L.R.R.M. 2930 (10th Cir. June 24, 1981) with Western
Wash. Laborers-Employers Health & Sec. Trust Fund v. Newman, 90 Lab. Cas. 25,913,
25,914 (W.D. Wash. 1980) and Eastern Dist. Council of United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Blake
Constr. Co., 457 F. Supp. 825, 826 (E.D. Va. 1978).
111. The contract remedy cases to date have not gone beyond retrospective enforcement
of prehire agreements. See, e.g., New Mexico Dist. Council of Carpenters v. Mayhew Co.,
107 L.R.R.M. 2930, 2932-34 (10th Cir. June 24, 1981).
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tract remedy are grounded in a quite different rationale. The
unique rationale makes the contract remedy for enforcement of
prehire agreements a questionable substitute for retrospective en-
forcement and, if followed to its logical conclusion, opens the door
for prospective enforcement of prehire agreements.
Courts applying the section 301 contract remedy have held that
the holding in Iron Workers does not preclude enforcement of
prehire agreements by a section 301 suit for breach of contract.112
In Iron Workers the Supreme Court held that picketing by a mi-
nority union to enforce a prehire agreement was equivalent to
recognitional picketing and thus was an unfair labor practice under
section 8(b)(7)(C) of the Act.113 Courts in the section 301 contract
remedy cases, however, limited the Iron Workers decision to cases
involving enforcement of prehire agreements by means of unfair
labor practices (picketing) and distinguished section 301 contract
enforcement cases from Iron Workers because section 301 suits did
not involve coercive recognition of a minority union as majority
representative.11 4 In section 301 suits, the union merely asked the
courts to enforce prehire agreement provisions regarding vested
trust fund benefit payments made for the benefit of individual em-
112. New Mexico Dist. Council of Carpenters v. Mayhew Co., 107 L.R.R.M. 2930 (10th
Cir. June 24, 1981); Contractors, Laborers, Teamsters & Eng'rs Health & Welfare Plan v.
Associated Wrecking Co., 638 F.2d 1128 (8th Cir. 1980); Trustees of Atlanta Iron Workers
Local 387 Pension Fund v. Southern Stress Wire Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1097 (N.D. Ga. 1981);
Western Wash. Cement Masons Health & Sec. Trust Funds v. Hillis Homes, Inc., 26 Wash.
App. 224, 612 P.2d 436 (1980).
113. 434 U.S. at 346; notes 26-41 & accompanying text supra.
114. The courts emphasized that Iron Workers involved an unfair labor practice proceed-
ing and not a breach of contract action. Contractors, Laborers, Teamsters & Eng'rs Health
& Welfare Plan v. Associated Wrecking Co., 638 F.2d 1128, 1133-34 (8th Cir. 1980); New
Mexico Dist. Council of Carpenters v. Mayhew Co., 107 L.R.R.M. 2930, 2932 (10th Cir. June
24, 1981); Western Wash. Cement Masons Health & Sec. Trust Funds v. Hillis Homes, Inc.,
26 Wash. App. 224, 612 P.2d 436 (1980).
Even though the courts distinguished Iron Workers from § 301 cases, the courts still ap-
plied the voidability rule of Iron Workers, see note 30 & accompanying text supra, by al-
lowing prehire agreements to be repudiated upon reasonable notice. New Mexico Dist.
Council of Carpenters v. Mayhew, 107 L.R.R.M. at 2932-33; Trustees of Atlanta Iron Work-
ers Local 387 Pension Fund v. Southern Stress Wire Corp., 509 F. Supp. at 1105. If, how-
ever, Iron Workers does not affect § 301 enforcement cases, then the voidability rule of Iron
Workers also should not apply. Thus, enforcement of prehire agreements under § 301 may
lead to prospective enforcement of prehire agreements.
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ployees regardless of the union's majority status.115 These courts,
therefore, held that under section 301 third party beneficiary trus-
tees could enforce trust fund provisions of prehire agreements.11 6
Two federal district courts that applied the rule of strict nonen-
forcement to prehire agreements also considered and rejected the
availability of section 301 to enforce prehire agreements 17 In
these cases, employers defended section 301 suits on the prehire
agreements by invoking the Iron Workers holding that prehire
agreements are unenforceable absent majority support.1 8 Plaintiffs
argued that in suits involving trust funds an employer may not as-
sert any defense it has to the prehire agreement. 1 9 In Iron Work-
ers the Supreme Court determined that, even though it had held
earlier that suits on the contract pursuant to section 301 were
within the jurisdiction of the federal courts, 20 that holding did not
resolve whether a contract is enforceable.1 21 The Court then said,
"[T]he union's majority standing is subject to litigation in a § 301
suit to enforce a [prehire agreement], just as it is in a[n] .. .un-
fair labor practice proceeding,- and that absent a showing that the
union is the majority's chosen instrument, the contract is unen-
115. See, e.g., Contractors, Laborers, Teamsters & Eng'rs Health & Welfare Plan v. Asso-
ciated Wrecking Co., 638 F.2d 1128, 1133-34 (8th Cir. 1980); Western Wash. Cement Masons
Health & Sec. Trust Funds v. Hills Homes, Inc., 26 Wash. App. 224, _, 612 P.2d 436, 440
(1980).
116. See, e.g., Trustees of Atlanta Iron Workers Local 387 Pension Fund v. Southern
Stress Wire Corp., 509 F. Supp. 1097, 1099-1100 (N.D. Ga. 1981). The obligation of an em-
ployer owed to a third party trust fund may be greater than that owed to the usual third
party beneficiary. Although an employer has a valid defense against enforcement of the con-
tract by a usual third party beneficiary, he will be estopped from asserting that defense in a
union trust fund suit because of the strong public policy of protecting the contracted-for
trust fund benefits of workers and their beneficiaries. Id.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Tenth Circuit, in New Mexico Dist. Council
of Carpenters v. Mayhew Co., 107 L.R.R.M. 2930 (10th Cir. June 24, 1981), briefly discussed
the applicability of § 301 to non-trust fund provisions of prehire agreements. The court
determined that wages and other provisions of the prehire agreement were enforceable by
contract suit just as were trust fund benefits. Id. at 2933.
117. Washington Area Carpenters' Welfare Fund v. Overhead Door Co., 488 F. Supp. 816
(D.D.C. 1980); Western Wash. Laborers-Employers Health & Sec. Trust Fund v. McDowell,
103 L.R.R.M. 2219 (W.D. Wash. 1979).
118. Washington Area Carpenters' Welfare Fund v. Overhead Door Co., 488 F. Supp. 816,
819 (D.D.C. 1980).
119. Id. at 817; see note 116 supra.
120. Retail Clerks Locals 128 & 633 v. Lion Dry Goods, Inc., 369 U.S. 17 (1962).
121. 434 U.S. at 351-52.
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forceable.' 1 22 Accordingly, the district courts held that employers
could defend section 301 suits by proving that the prehire agree-
ment lacked majority support and thus was unenforceable. 123
Beyond the dictum found in Iron Workers, however, the courts
advanced other arguments against enforcement of prehire agree-
ments by section 301 suits on the contract. The general policy of
disallowing contractual defenses in third party trust fund cases is
based on the premise of guaranteeing workers the health and re-
tirement benefits that they reasonably expect as the terms of their
employment.124 The United States District Court for the District
of Columbia, however, argued that the rationale of protecting fu-
ture expectations is not applicable when an agreement by its na-
ture makes no promise of future benefits. 25
Although the courts allowing the section 301 remedy have devel-
oped sound legal arguments supporting this method of enforcing
prehire agreements, the potential for prospective enforcement of
section 8(f) prehire agreements makes the rule one that should not
be followed. Section 301 is a powerful tool for the enforcement of
collective bargaining agreements. As the Supreme Court suggested
in Iron Workers, however, a prehire agreement should not be en-
forceable in a section 301 suit unless the union shows majority sup-
port.12 If the courts extend section 301 suits to allow enforcement
of prehire agreements, 27 the courts will have directed an en-
trenched relationship between unions and employers. Such en-
forcement of a prehire agreement of a minority union disrupts the
integrity of the majority representation rule. 2
This problem has no remedy other than legislative clarification
or Supreme Court action. The section 301 contract remedy is a le-
122. Id. (dictum).
123. Washington Area Carpenters' Welfare Fund v. Overhead Door Co., 488 F. Supp. 816,
818-19 (D.D.C. 1980); Western Wash. Laborers-Employers Health & Sec. Trust Fund v. Mc-
Dowell, 103 L.R.R.M. 2219, 2220-21 (W.D. Wash. 1979). But see note 82 & accompanying
text supra.
124. Washington Area Carpenters' Welfare Fund v. Overhead Door Co., 488 F. Supp. 816,
819 (D.D.C. 1980).
125. Id. Future expectations based on a prehire agreement cannot be anticipated when a
prehire agreement may be repudiated at any time. Id.
126. 434 U.S. at 351-52; see notes 121-123 & accompanying text supra.
127. See note 114 supra.
128. See note 1 & accompanying text supra.
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gitimate use of that provision absent an authoritative prohibition
to the contrary. The dictum of Iron Workers on the possible unen-
forceability of prehire agreements in the context of section 301
contract suits may have an influential impact on future cases,129
but the discussion is not mandatory precedent 30 and will not dis-
suade a court intent on distinguishing Iron Workers. Should the
Supreme Court directly address the enforcement of section 301
contract suits, the Court could declare section 301 suits to be in-
consistent with the legislative intent of section 8(f) and thus not a
proper remedy in such instances, or the Court could permit the use
of section 301 to enforce prehire agreements retroactively. Because
such a limitation merely would duplicate the retrospective enforce-
ment rule,131 however, the better solution is an absolute bar on the
use of section 301 suits to enforce prehire agreements.
CONCLUSION
Neither section 8(f) nor the Supreme Court ruling in Iron Work-
ers give much guidance on the problem of enforceability of prehire
agreements when picketing is not involved. The dilemma arises be-
cause the majority representation rule conflicts with the equitable
argument that employers should be held to their contractual obli-
gations when the union has carried out its duties. The retrospec-
tive enforcement rule best accommodates these divergent interests
because the rule gives effect to prehire agreements up until notice
of termination is given, thus avoiding the inequity of retrospective
abrogation that occurs under the strict nonenforcement rule. The
rule also preserves the majority representation rule by holding
prehire agreements unenforceable upon reasonable notice. By con-
trast, the section 301 remedy rule allows plenary enforcement of
prehire agreements, thus wholly subverting the majority represen-
tation principle, which is a basic tenet of labor law.
DOUGLAS B. HABIG
129. See notes 120-123 & accompanying text supra.
130. See note 82 & accompanying text supra.
131. See notes 85-94 & accompanying text supra.
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